The recent application of deep learning models to financial trading has heightened the need for high fidelity financial time series data. This synthetic data can be used to supplement historical data to train large trading models. The state-of-the-art models for the generative application often rely on huge amounts of historical data and large, complicated models. These models range from autoregres-sive and diffusion-based models through to architecturally simpler models such as the temporal-attention bilinear layer. Agent-based approaches to modelling limit order book dynamics can also recreate trading activity through mechanistic models of trader behaviours. In this work, we demonstrate how a popular agent-based framework for simulating intraday trading activity, the Chiarella model, can be combined with one of the most performant deep learning models for forecasting multi-variate time series, the T ABL model. This forecasting model is coupled to a simulation of a matching engine with a novel method for simulating deleted order flow. Our simulator gives us the ability to test the generative abilities of the forecasting model using stylised facts. Our results show that this methodology generates realistic price dynamics however, when analysing deeper, parts of the markets microstructure are not accurately recreated, highlighting the necessity for including more sophisticated agent behaviors into the modeling framework to help account for tail events.

Execution algorithms are vital to modern trading, they enable market participants to execute large orders while minimising market impact and transaction costs. As these algorithms grow more sophisticated, optimising them becomes increasingly challenging. In this work, we present a reinforcement learning (RL) framework for discovering optimal execution strategies, evaluated within a reactive agent-based market simulator. This simulator creates reactive order flow and allows us to decompose slippage into its constituent components: market impact and execution risk. We assess the RL agent's performance using the efficient frontier based on work by Almgren and Chriss, measuring its ability to balance risk and cost. Results show that the RL-derived strategies consistently outperform baselines and operate near the efficient frontier, demonstrating a strong ability to optimise for risk and impact. These findings highlight the potential of reinforcement learning as a powerful tool in the trader's toolkit.

In this paper, we show how $K$-nearest neighbor ($K$-NN) resampling, an off-policy evaluation method proposed in \cite{giegrich2023k}, can be applied to simulate limit order book (LOB) markets and how it can be used to evaluate and calibrate trading strategies. Using historical LOB data, we demonstrate that our simulation method is capable of recreating realistic LOB dynamics and that synthetic trading within the simulation leads to a market impact in line with the corresponding literature. Compared to other statistical LOB simulation methods, our algorithm has theoretical convergence guarantees under general conditions, does not require optimization, is easy to implement and computationally efficient. Furthermore, we show that in a benchmark comparison our method outperforms a deep learning-based algorithm for several key statistics. In the context of a LOB with pro-rata type matching, we demonstrate how our algorithm can calibrate the size of limit orders for a liquidation strategy. Finally, we describe how $K$-NN resampling can be modified for choices of higher dimensional state spaces.

We consider the design of strategies for market making in an exchange. A market maker generally seeks to profit from the difference between the buy and sell price of an asset, yet the market maker also takes exposure risk in the event of large price movements. Profit guarantees for market making strategies have typically required certain stochastic assumptions on the price fluctuations of the asset in question; for example, assuming a model in which the price process is mean reverting. We propose a class of "spread-based" market making strategies whose performance can be controlled even under worst-case (adversarial) settings. We prove structural properties of these strategies which allows us to design a master algorithm which obtains low regret relative to the best such strategy in hindsight. We run a set of experiments showing favorable performance on recent real-world stock price data.

We consider the learning dynamics of a single reinforcement learning optimal execution trading agent when it interacts with an event driven agent-based financial market model. Trading takes place asynchronously through a matching engine in event time. The optimal execution agent is considered at different levels of initial order-sizes and differently sized state spaces. The resulting impact on the agent-based model and market are considered using a calibration approach that explores changes in the empirical stylised facts and price impact curves. Convergence, volume trajectory and action trace plots are used to visualise the learning dynamics. Here the smaller state space agents had the number of states they visited converge much faster than the larger state space agents, and they were able to start learning to trade intuitively using the spread and volume states. We find that the moments of the model are robust to the impact of the learning agents except for the Hurst exponent, which was lowered by the introduction of strategic order-splitting. The introduction of the learning agent preserves the shape of the price impact curves but can reduce the trade-sign auto-correlations when their trading volumes increase.

Deep learning has achieved great success in recent years, mainly due to advances in machine learning algorithms and computer hardware. As a result, it has become an indispensable tool in a wide range of fields, both in research and in practical applications. Specifically, in finance, deep learning has been applied extensively to predict stock prices movements using limit order book data. This technique is particularly effective in handling complex data which statistical models often struggle to manage. Notable works in the recent literature include [34, 26, 25, 33]. In particular, contrastive learning (CL) is a powerful technique in deep learning that has led to significant advances in representation learning.

LOBs [22] are a fundamental market mechanism, which are used across a significant proportion of financial markets, including all major stock and derivatives exchanges. The benefits of having robust and realistic simulators for these markets are numerous. For example, they would allow the study of markets under different assumptions, and the investigation of AI techniques for training trading strategies. In a LOB market, matched orders result in trades and unmatched orders are stored in the two parts of the LOB, a collection of buy orders called bids (the bid book), and a collection of sell orders called asks (the ask book). Typically, each side of the LOB will contains hundreds of individual orders, and a real market would be updated at micro-second time resolution, driven by a wide range of market participants and facilitated by "high-frequency" market makers [45]. The development of AI-based automated trading strategies for LOB markets has been a growth area in recent years, both within academia and industry, spurred on in part by developments in deep learning and reinforcement learning. Two typical LOB trading problems that have been investigated are market making, where the goal is to provide liquidity to the market by being continually willing to buy and sell an asset (see, e.g., Spooner et al. [50], Jerome et al. [28], Gasperov and Kostanjcar 1

Market making (MM) is an important research topic in quantitative finance, the agent needs to continuously optimize ask and bid quotes to provide liquidity and make profits. The limit order book (LOB) contains information on all active limit orders, which is an essential basis for decision-making. The modeling of evolving, high-dimensional and low signal-to-noise ratio LOB data is a critical challenge. Traditional MM strategy relied on strong assumptions such as price process, order arrival process, etc. Previous reinforcement learning (RL) works handcrafted market features, which is insufficient to represent the market. This paper proposes a RL agent for market making with LOB data. We leverage a neural network with convolutional filters and attention mechanism (Attn-LOB) for feature extraction from LOB. We design a new continuous action space and a hybrid reward function for the MM task. Finally, we conduct comprehensive experiments on latency and interpretability, showing that our agent has good applicability.

This paper introduces the Neural Network for Nonlinear Hawkes processes (NNNH), a non-parametric method based on neural networks to fit nonlinear Hawkes processes. Our method is suitable for analyzing large datasets in which events exhibit both mutually-exciting and inhibitive patterns. The NNNH approach models the individual kernels and the base intensity of the nonlinear Hawkes process using feed forward neural networks and jointly calibrates the parameters of the networks by maximizing the log-likelihood function. We utilize Stochastic Gradient Descent to search for the optimal parameters and propose an unbiased estimator for the gradient, as well as an efficient computation method. We demonstrate the flexibility and accuracy of our method through numerical experiments on both simulated and real-world data, and compare it with state-of-the-art methods. Our results highlight the effectiveness of the NNNH method in accurately capturing the complexities of nonlinear Hawkes processes.

In a semi-realistic market simulator, independent reinforcement learning algorithms may facilitate market makers to maintain wide spreads even without communication. This unexpected outcome challenges the current antitrust law framework. We study the effectiveness of maker-taker fee models in preventing cooperation via algorithms. After modeling market making as a repeated general-sum game, we experimentally show that the relation between net transaction costs and maker rebates is not necessarily monotone. Besides an upper bound on taker fees, we may also need a lower bound on maker rebates to destabilize the cooperation. We also consider the taker-maker model and the effects of mid-price volatility, inventory risk, and the number of agents.